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In recent years, tort reform has been a topic of debate between 
lawyers, politicians, and scholars.  In the most recent Presidential 
campaign, George W. Bush focused on tort reform as one issue that 
our nation should address.1  Proponents of tort reform focus on rising 
medical costs and exorbitant insurance premiums doctors must pay to 
argue for reform through avenues such as placing a cap on tort 
damages.2  Much of the mainstream tort reform debate centers around 
malpractice claims against doctors; however, often left out of the 
discussion is devising measures to protect medical device and drug 
manufacturers from liability.  One means of protection for these 
manufacturers is the affirmative defense of preemption.3  Congress 
                                                 
*  J.D. candidate, May 2006, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology.   
1  Dan Zegart, Tort Reform Advocates Play Fast and Loose With the Facts, 
MONTANA LAWYER, February 2005, at 30. 
2  See e.g. Geoff Boehm, Debunking Medical Malpractice Myths:  Unraveling 
The False Premises Behind “Tort Reform,” 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y  L. & ETHICS 
357 (2005) (Arguing against placing caps on victim’s damages award and instead 
focus on regulating the insurance industry). 
3  See DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 14.4 (2005) (“When 
enacting product safety legislation, Congress normally vests regulatory authority 
over the matter in a federal administrative agency, often specifying, in a preemption 
clause, that state law may not interfere with safety standards or “requirements” in the 
statute itself or, more typically, as promulgated by the federal agency”).  
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has drafted preemption provisions into many of its regulatory schemes, 
which serve to limit common law tort claims and effectuate tort reform 
“through the back door.”4
Within the realm of medical devices, the Supreme Court has 
refused to allow the preemption defense for devices receiving 
certification under the 510(k) process.5  While a vast majority of Class 
III medical devices are marketed using the 510(k) process, the Court 
has yet to speak on the issue of preemption with regard to medical 
devices approved under the pre-market approval process (“PMA”).  
When and if the Court hears the issue, it should agree with 7th Circuit 
analysis, and hold that completing the PMA process shields medical 
device manufacturers from common law tort liability through the 
affirmative defense of preemption.  Doing so will provide a reasonable 
avenue of tort reform, while also balancing the competing concerns of 
developing innovative medical devices with protecting the public from 
injuries resulting from medical devices.  
Part I of this article will provide a historical background to the 
issue of preemption in medical device cases.  Preemption arguments 
have been reborn following the Supreme Court’s decision in Cipollone 
v. Liggett Group, Inc.6  Part II will review the case of McMullen v. 
Medtronic, Inc., 421 F.3d 482, 484-85 (7th Cir. 2005) and its 
predecessor, Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 126 F.3d 902 (7th Cir. 1997) .   
These cases firmly established the rule that common law tort claims 
against PMA devices are preempted.  Part III will discuss the broad 
procedural and policy implications of the 7th Circuit’s rationale.  By 
balancing competing policy interests, the 7th Circuit has adopted the 
proper rule.  Part IV will analyze the arguments against the               
                                                 
4  See e.g. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2006) (Preemption provision of the Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act); 49 U.S.C. § 30103(b)(1) (2006) 
(Preemption provision of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act); 21 
U.S.C. 360(k) (2006) (Preemption provision of the Medical Device Amendments to 
the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act); 49 U.S.C. § 4306 (2006) (Preemption provision 
of the Federal Boat Safety Act); 15 U.S.C. § 2075(a) (2006) (Preemption provision 
of the Consumer Product Safety Act).  
5  Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996). 
6  505 U.S. 504 (1992). 
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7th Circuit’s reasoning, and discuss specific problems with various 
courts’ analysis.  Part V will analyze whether the Supreme Court is 
likely to adopt the 7th Circuit’s reasoning, especially in light of the 
changes to the Court since its last relevant decision in 1996.  The 
addition of Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito, will 
have an impact on the future of preemption analysis within the 
medical device contest.  Examining their histories with medical device 
preemption may shed some light on how they will decide the issue.   
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
“No issue in modern products liability law is more important, or 
more inscrutable, than the doctrine of federal preemption.”7  Until the 
Supreme Court’s 1992 decision in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 
offering the affirmative defense of express federal preemption was not, 
in most cases, a successful venture.8  Since Cipollone, express federal 
preemption has been a hotly contested issue in cases involving the 
regulation of pesticides and insecticides, motor vehicles, air bags, 
recreational boats, consumer products, workplace products, drugs, and, 
as discussed below, medical devices.9     
 
A. History of the Medical Device Amendments 
                                                 
7  Owen, supra note 3 at 895. 
8  Id. at 901. 
9  Owen, supra note 3 (citing numerous cases involving preemption within 
these contexts); See e.g. Williams v. Dow Chemical Co., 255 F. Supp. 2d 219 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (preemption analysis of federal regulation of pesticides and 
insecticides); Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995) (preemption 
analysis of federal regulation of motor vehicles);  Geier v. American Honda Motor 
Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (preemption analysis of federal regulation of air bags); 
Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002) (preemption analysis of federal 
regulation of recreational boats); Cortez v. MTD Prod., Inc., 927 F. Supp. 386 (N.D. 
Cal. 1996) (preemption analysis of federal regulation of consumer products); 
Pedraza v. Shell Oil Co., 942 F.2d 48 (1st Cir. 1991) (preemption analysis of federal 
regulation of workplace products); Bell v. Lollar, 791 N.E.2d 849 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2003) (preemption analysis of federal regulation of drugs); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 
518 U.S. 470 (1996) (preemption analysis of federal regulation of medical devices). 
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In 1976, Congress enacted the Medical Device Amendments 
(“MDA”) to the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”), in which the 
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) was appointed to regulate the 
safety and effectiveness of medical devices.10  Some medical devices, 
originally touted as safe and effective, were posing severe health risks 
to consumers, including death.11  Responding to its grant of authority 
and the growing concern for consumer safety, the FDA created three 
different categories of medical devices, organized according to their 
potential safety risks.  Class I devices, such as tongue depressors, 
receive a minimal level of regulation because they pose minimal risk 
to the public.12  Class II devices, such as tampons or hearing aids, are 
subjected to “special controls” because of the potentially more harmful 
results of their use.13   Class III devices, such as pacemakers or 
artificial hearts, are regulated subject to the most exacting controls, 
because these devices pose a “potential unreasonable risk of illness or 
injury.”14  To market a Class III device, a manufacturer must present 
enough evidence to instill in the FDA a “reasonable assurance” that 
the device is safe and effective for consumers.15   
The FDA requires all Class III medical devices to receive “pre-
market approval.”16  To obtain approval under the PMA process, a 
manufacturer must submit many documents to the FDA:  “a 
bibliography of all reports concerning the device’s safety and 
effectiveness, an outline of the device’s components and properties, a 
                                                 
10  See 21 U.S.C. § 360 (2006). 
11  Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 476 (1996) (examining various 
hearings before Congress in 1973, during which Congress examined devices such as 
the Dalkon Shield, a intrauterine conceptive device, that was declared to be safe and 
effective, but led to a high percentage of inadvertent pregnancies, serious infections 
and even death.  Other devices Congress examined that potentially posed safety 
concerns included catheters, artificial heart valves, defibrillators and pacemakers). 
12  Owen, supra note 3 at 910. 
13  Id. 
14  21 U.S.C. § 360c(1)(C) (2006).   
15  21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(2) (2006).   
16  21 U.S.C. § 360e (2006). 
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description of the manufacturing process, safety data, samples of the 
device, copies of all proposed labeling,” along with any other FDA 
required material.17  Once this information is received, the FDA then 
spends an average of 1,200 hours reviewing the device, requesting 
further testing and information, and imposing other conditions that 
must be met before the device reaches the market.18  Often, the FDA 
will require changes be made to the device or its warnings before it 
can receive full approval.  For example, in Brooks v. Howmedica, Inc., 
the Eighth Circuit examined the regulations and requirements placed 
on Simplex bone cement during the approval process.19  The court 
noted that the FDA had required specific warning language both 
during and after the approval process.20  When the FDA does not alter 
a PMA application, it has determined that the manufacturer-drafted 
warnings, labeling, design, etc. are sufficient and in need of no 
revision. 
While the PMA process is generally required before Class III 
devices can be placed in the market, the rule has two significant 
exceptions.  “These exceptions have developed a propensity for 
                                                 
17  Martin v. Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 105 F.3d 1090, 1095 (6th Cir. 
1997); See also 21 C.F.R. § 814.20 (2006). 
18  Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 478-79 (1996).   
19  273 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2001). 
20  Id.; See also Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 1363 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(examining the PMA process for the HeartMate ventricular assist device.  From 
1975-1985 the manufacturer conducted studies on live animals and human cadavers.  
In 1985, the HeartMate was granted and investigational device exemption from the 
FDA to begin clinical trials.  For seven years clinical trials were conducted at 
hospitals.  During this period the manufacturer submitted extensive information to 
the FDA, and the FDA responded with numerous inquiries into the safety and 
effectiveness of the device.  The FDA, after review, also approved design changes 
that were made to prevent leaks from the HeartMate’s screw ring.  In 1992, the 
manufacturer submitted its PMA application to the FDA.  For two years, the 
manufacturer submitted a substantial amount of amendments to the device and 
responded to numerous FDA questions.  In 1994, after extensive review, the 
HeartMate received final approval under the PMA process, in the form specified in 
the final application). 
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swallowing the rule.”21  First, devices on the market prior to May 28, 
1976 are grandfathered in from this requirement, until the FDA 
completes the PMA process for such devices.22  Second, 
manufacturers may be able to enter a limited form of review called 
“premarket notification.”23  This type of FDA review, also known as 
“the § 510(k) process,” is available to manufacturers when their device 
is “substantially equivalent” to other devices on the market prior to the 
MDA in 1976.24  On average, the FDA spends only twenty hours of 
review to determine whether a device may be initially marketed under 
the § 510(k) process.25
When Congress enacted the MDA, it included an express 
preemption provision, as it does with many other regulatory statutes.26  
Because of the different avenues of review a device can take before 
entering the market, courts have struggled with when to apply the 
preemption provision.  The language of the preemption provision 
states the following:   
 
(a) General rule 
       Except as provided in subsection (b) 
of this section, no State or political 
subdivision of a State may establish or 
continue in effect with respect to a 
device intended for human use any 
requirement— 
(1)  which is different from, or in 
addition to, any requirement applicable 
under this chapter to the device, and 
                                                 
21  Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 126 F.3d 902, 905 (7th Cir. 1997); See also 
Horn, 376 F.3d at 1367 (noting that in 2003, only 54 of 9,872 medical device 
applications to the FDA were requesting PMA review.  In 2002 only 49 of 10,323 
medical device applications requested PMA review). 
22  Mitchell, 126 F.3d at 905. 
23  Lohr, 518 U.S. at 478. 
24  Id. 
25  Id. 
26  See statutes cited supra note 4. 
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(2)  which relates to the safety or 
effectiveness of the device or to any 
other matter included in a requirement 
applicable to the device under this 
chapter.27
 
 Thus, should a state seek to impose a “requirement” on a device 
that differs from a requirement already placed on the device during the 
device review process, such a requirement would be preempted.  This 
provision has required courts to struggle with two major questions:  1) 
what constitutes a state requirement, and 2) what, if any, federal 
requirements exist during device review?   
 
B. Scope of Preemption – Medtronic v. Lohr  
 
The Supreme Court first analyzed the scope of the MDA 
preemption provision in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr.28  Lora Lohr 
depended on a pacemaker to properly regulate her heart.29  In 1987, 
she had a Medtronic pacemaker implanted to serve this function.30  
However, the pacemaker failed in 1990, requiring immediate 
surgery.31  Lohr’s physician stated that the type of lead in the 
pacemaker was the likely cause of failure.32  Medtronic had received 
clearance from the FDA under the 510(k) process to market the 
device.33  Lohr and her husband brought a common law tort claim 
against Medtronic alleging negligence and strict liability34  A divided 
court held that the 510(k) process of device review did not create any 
federal requirements on the pacemaker and thus Lohr’s common-law 
                                                 
27  21 U.S.C. § 360(k) (2006). 
28  518 U.S. 470. 
29  Id. at 480. 
30  Id.  
31  Id. at 481. 
32  Id. 
33  Id. at 480. 
34  Id. at 481. 
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tort claims could not be preempted.35  Accordingly, preemption 
arguments under 510(k) review have ended.  Nevertheless, the Court 
has yet to answer the question of preemption under the more rigorous 
PMA avenue of device review. The three opinions in Lohr help shed 
some light on arguments made for both sides. 
 
1. Justice Stevens’ Opinion 
 
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Kennedy, Souter and Ginsburg, 
wrote for a majority of the Court in parts I, II, III, V, and VII of his 
opinion. 36  At the outset, Justice Stevens examined the differences 
between the 510(k) process exemption and the PMA process.  “The 
510(k) process is by no means comparable to the PMA process; in 
contrast to the 1,200 hours necessary to complete a PMA review, the 
510(k) review is completed in an average of 20 hours.”37  Discussing 
the various causes of action, a unanimous Court held that the defective 
design claims were not preempted because the 510(k) process was 
only focused on equivalence.  In fact, Medtronic only had to comply 
with “general standards—the lowest level of protection [to 
manufacturers]—applicable to all medical devices.”38  The Court 
found that the 510(k) process thus could not constitute a federal 
requirement “specific to a device.”39   
Later, the Court stated that even if 510(k) did impose 
requirements, and state common law claims could be considered 
requirements, the claims that Medtronic violated specific FDA 
regulations could be maintained.40  For example, the Court held that 
the manufacturing and labeling claims were not preempted, because 
                                                 
35  Id. at 492-503.  
36  Justice Breyer concurred with the opinion except for parts IV or VI. 
37  Lohr, 518 U.S. at 478-479 (referring to the PMA process and “rigorous” and 
noting that “in 1990, 80% of the Class III devices were being introduced through the 
510(k) process and without PMA review”). 
38  Id. at 493-94. 
39  Id. 
40  Id. at 495. 
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the FDA-maintained device regulations—both in the manufacturing 
and labeling areas—were requirements of general applicability and 
could not be said to be specific to the device in question.41
Writing for a plurality of the Court in Parts IV and VI of his 
opinion, Justice Stevens disagreed with Medtronic’s argument that 
Congress intended to preclude all common law causes of actions:   
 
If Congress intended to preclude all 
common-law causes of action, it chose a 
singularly odd word with which to do it.  
The statute would have achieved an 
identical result, for instance, if it had 
precluded any “remedy” under state law 
relating to medical devices.  
‘Requirement’ appears to presume that 
the State is imposing a specific duty on 
the manufacturer.42
 
The plurality argued that the MDA would rarely preempt common 
law causes of action, because the word requirement “is linked with 
language suggesting that its focus is device-specific enactments of 
positive law by legislative or administrative bodies, not the application 
of general rules of common law by judges and juries.”43
 
2. Justice O’Connor’s Dissenting Opinion 
 
Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
Scalia and Thomas, argued that a common law duty was a requirement 
because a common law action “operate[s] to require manufacturers to 
                                                 
41  Id. at 497-98 (examining general labeling regulations found in 21 CFR §§ 
801.109 (b) and (c).  Furthermore, the Court noted that “manufacturers are required 
to comply with ‘Good Manufacturing Practices,’…which are set fort in 32 
sections…in the Code of Federal Regulations”). 
42  Lohr, 518 U.S. at 487 (plurality) (Stevens, J.). 
43  Id. at 489 (emphasis added). 
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comply with common law duties.”44 Thus, claims will be preempted 
“where such requirements [imposed by common law actions] would 
differ from those imposed by the FDCA.”45  Justice O’Connor agreed 
with the Court with regards to the Lohr’s defective design claims and 
stated that the claim “[I]s not preempted by the [] 510(k) ‘substantial 
equivalency’ process,” because this process only focuses on whether 
devices are equivalent.46   
Justice O’Connor wrote separately from the majority with regards 
to the manufacturing and labeling claims.47  She argued that the FDA’s 
Good Manufacturing Process (GMP) regulations,48 and extensive 
labeling regulations,49 impose federal requirements on medical 
devices.  Because Lohr was arguing that different or additional 
manufacturing and labeling requirements were needed, her claims 
were preempted.50  Thus, O’Connor and the other dissenting Justices 
took a broader view of the role of preemption in MDA cases. 
 
3. Justice Breyer’s Opinion 
 
Justice Breyer wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment.51  He formed a majority of the Court 
when opining that State common law tort actions would impose 
requirements specific to medical devices.52  To determine whether the 
510(k) process imposed specific federal requirements, Breyer first 
                                                 
44  Lohr, 518 U.S. at 510 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
45  Id. at 509. 
46  Id. 
47  Id. at 513-514. 
48  See e.g. 21 C.F.R. § 820.20 (2006). 
49  See e.g. 21 C.F.R. § 801.109 (2006). 
50  Lohr, 518 U.S. at 514. (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
51  Lohr, 518 U.S. at 503-08 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment). 
52  Id. at 504-05 (agreeing with the opinion written by Justice O’Connor). 
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looked to the language of the preemption provision.53  Finding that the 
wording was highly ambiguous, Justice Breyer looked elsewhere to 
determine which federal requirements preempted state requirements.  
Noting that the FDA has a special understanding of “whether state 
requirements may interfere with federal objectives,” Breyer argued 
that the FDA’s interpretation should be given some level of respect.54  
Breyer noted that the FDA could communicate its intentions through 
“statements in ‘regulations, preambles, interpretive statements, and 
responses to comments.’”55  With respect to the FDA’s own current 
regulation regarding preemption, there must be a “specific [federal] 
requirement applicable to a particular device.”56  Because the FDA did 
not impose any requirements specific to the pacemaker—that is, only 
general requirements—preemption did not apply.57   
 
C.  Post Medtronic v. Lohr Litigation 
 
While the Court’s judgment in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr cut-off 
preemption arguments in 510(k) approved devices, a whole realm of 
litigation regarding medical devices receiving approval under the PMA 
process developed.  A majority of U.S. Circuit Court’s have concluded 
that the PMA process does impose specific federal requirements on 
medical devices and therefore warrants preemption of common law 
claims.58  Other Circuit’s, and various other courts, argue that either 
the PMA process does not rise to the level of a device-specific 
requirement, or state common law tort actions are not within the 
purview of the MDA preemption provision.59   
                                                 
53  Id. 
54  Id. at 506. 
55  Id; See also supra note 146. 
56  Lohr, 518 U.S. at 506 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment); See CFR § 808.1(d) (2006). 
57  Lohr, 518 U.S. at 507 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
58  See cases cited infra note 106. 
59  See cases cited infra note 107. 
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II.  THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT APPROACH TO PREEMPTION AND PMA 
 
Following Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, the 7th Circuit held that 
specific requirements are placed on medical devices during the PMA 
process.60  Furthermore, common law tort claims, which would 
impose requirements different from or in addition to those already 
imposed during the PMA process, would be preempted.61  Recently, 
the 7th Circuit re-affirmed this precedent in McMullen v. Medtronic, 
Inc., and analyzed whether two FDA regulations preempted common 
law tort claims.62
 
A. Mitchell v. Collagen – PMA Preempts Most Common Law Claims. 
 
In 1988, Barbara Mitchell received several injections of Zyderm, 
a collagen-based product used to fill in tissue under the skin when the 
tissue is lost due to injury, age, infection or other diseases.63  Zyderm 
had received original PMA approval in 1981 and additional PMA 
approval when the FDA conducted a re-review from 1991-1992.  
Sometime after the injections, Mitchell developed serious medical 
complications.64  She brought a complaint against Collagen, alleging 
that Collagen was liable for her complications under theories of strict 
liability, negligence, fraud, mislabeling, misbranding, adulteration and 
breach of warranty.65  During the 7th Circuit’s first review of the case 
in 1995, it held that the MDA allowed for at least some state common 
law tort claims to be preempted.66  Furthermore, because specific 
requirements were placed on medical devices during the PMA process, 
                                                 
60  Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 126 F.3d 902 (7th Cir. 1997). 
61  Id.  
62  421 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2005). 
63  Mitchell, 126 F.3d at 905. 
64  Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1268 (7th Cir. 1995). 
65  Mitchell, 126 F.3d at 906. 
66  Mitchell, 67 F.3d 1268. 
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the Court held that most of Mitchell’s claims would be preempted.67  
The Mitchell’s appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted 
certiorari and then remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit to 
reconsider the Mitchell’s claims in light of the intervening Medtronic 
v. Lohr decision.   
Upon re-review, the 7th Circuit stood by its initial decision.  After 
analyzing the various opinions in Lohr, the court noted that the 
Supreme Court’s decision was not without its own ambiguities.68  The 
court began sifting through these ambiguities to reach its ultimate 
decision.  First, the court noted that a majority of the Supreme Court—
Justice O’Connor and those joining her opinion, as well as Justice 
Breyer in his concurring opinion—held that the MDA preempted at 
least some state common law claims.69   
Second, the court noted that the PMA process is substantially 
different than the 510(k) process involved in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr.70  
Because of the rigors of the PMA process, the court held that the 
process imposes specific federal regulation or requirements on the 
medical devices.71  The court found that with respect to the PMA 
process “the federal government…has ‘weighed the competing 
interests relevant to the particular requirement in question, reached an 
unambiguous conclusion about how those competing considerations 
should be resolved in a particular case or set of cases, and 
implemented that conclusion via a specific mandate on manufacturers 
or producers.’”72
                                                 
67  Id. (holding that one fraud claim and a breach of express warranty claim 
would not be preempted, since they did not add any requirement different from or in 
addition to requirements already imposed by the FDA). 
68  Mitchell, 126 F.3d at 910 (“[T]he holding in Medtronic contains several 
ambiguities that impair our ability to perceive with absolute clarity the path that the 
Court has chosen for us to follow.”). 
69  Id. 
70  Id. at 911. 
71  Id. (discussing Fry v. Allergan Medical Optics 695 A.2d 511 (R.I. 1997)). 
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Third, the court discussed which types of common law claims 
would be preempted by the PMA process.  The court stated that “[I]t is 
necessary to examine the state law cause of action at a sufficiently 
precise level of generality to determine whether the final judgment of 
the state court would impose on the manufacturer a burden 
incompatible with the requirements imposed by the FDA.”73  In other 
words, so long as the plaintiff’s claim alleged a departure from FDA-
imposed standards, the claim would not be preempted; however, if the 
claim alleged that the manufacturer failed to make adjustments or 
corrections to the device not required by the FDA, the claim would be 
preempted insofar as it would impose a requirement different from or 
in addition to those already required by the FDA.74
When the court examined the Mitchell’s claims, it determined that 
the strict liability, negligence, mislabeling, misbranding, adulteration, 
fraud and implied warranty claims were all preempted.  Each of these 
claims, if successful, would impose requirements on Zyderm that were 
different from or in addition to those already placed on Zyderm during 
the PMA process.75  While most avenues of recovery were closed by 
preemption, the court did state that had there been an express 
warranty, Mitchell could recover against Collagen for breach of any 
express warranty.76
 
B. McMullen v. Medtronic – Reaffirming Mitchell’s Reasoning. 
 
Recently, the 7th Circuit had the opportunity to revisit its decision 
from Mitchell v. Collagen Corp.77  In McMullen v. Medtronic, Inc. the 
                                                 
73 Mitchell, 126 F.3d at 912 (relying on the reasoning of Judge Rovner from 
Chambers v. Osteonics Corp. 109 F.3d 1243 (7th Cir. 1997), a case dealing with the 
preemptive effect of the MDA under the investigational device exemption (IDE) for 
Class III medical devices). 
74 Mitchell, 126 F.3d at 912-915. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. (noting that the Mitchell’s had failed to specify they were relying on such 
a claim, and that the Mitchell’s had never stated that Collagen had given them an 
express warranty of the product.) 
77 126 F.3d 902. 
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court examined the case of Jack and Barbara McMullen, who had 
brought suit against Medtronic claiming that Medtronic had breached 
its post sale duty to warn.78  In May 2000, Jack McMullen opted to 
have two of Medtronic’s Activas implanted into his brain.79  He had 
been suffering from Parkinson’s Disease since 1985, and the 
Medtronic Activa was being successfully used in the suppression of 
tremors for those diagnosed with Parkinson’s Disease.  The Activa is a 
class III medical device that received full PMA approval in 1997.80   
During the PMA process, the FDA issued at least two 
requirements on the Activa.  First, Medtronic was required to track the 
name and contact information of patients implanted with Activa.81  
Second, the FDA required Medtronic to issue specific warnings 
regarding the terms “electrocautery” and “diathermy” in its manuals.82  
The warnings the FDA required were as follows: 
 
Tell your dentist where your IPG is 
implanted, so he or she can take 
precautions with dental drills and 
ultrasonic probes used to clean your 
teeth.  These devices should not be used 
directly over the implant site.  
Therapeutic ultrasound, electrolysis, 
radiation therapy, and electrocautery also 
should not be used directly over the 
implant site…Diathermy treatments that 
are sometimes used for muscle 
relaxation may affect the 
                                                 
78  421 F.3d 482, 484-85 (7th Cir. 2005). 
79  Id. at 485. 
80  Id. at 484-85. 
81  Id. 
82  Id. (defining “electrocautery” as the burning or searing of tissue by means 
of an electrically heated instrument, and defining “diathermy” as therapeutic local 
heating by means of passing electric currents through tissue). 
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neurostimulator output and/or damage its 
electronics.83
 
 Following implantation, Jack Mullen “experienced an excellent 
remediation of his Parkinson’s symptoms.”84  However, in March of 
2001, McMullen visited his dentist and underwent a procedure that 
may have involved diathermy or electrocautery.85  Following the 
procedure, he experienced a reduction in the ability of the Activa to 
sufficiently control his tremors.86  After undergoing more surgeries to 
replace various components of the Activas, McMullen still did not 
receive the same beneficial effects he had before the dentist visit.87  
McMullen argued that the procedure at the dentist office led to 
damaged brain tissue surrounding the devices.88   
The basis for McMullen’s argument stemmed from a report 
Medtronic learned of in January of 2001.  The report detailed a 70 year 
old individual with Parkinson’s Disease that had been implanted with 
one of Medtronic’s Activa devices.  The individual received diathermy 
treatment from his dentist following oral surgery, and subsequently 
went into a coma during the treatment.  Furthermore, the report listed 
the possible cause of the coma as damaged brain tissue around the 
wires to the device.89  In May 2001, following further investigation of 
the report, Medtronic sent letters to both physicians and patients 
warning them that individuals implanted with an Activa “cannot” have 
any diathermy performed anywhere on their body, because the “energy 
from diathermy [could] be transferred through [their] system, [could] 
cause tissue damage and [could] result in severe injury or death.”90
                                                 
83  Id. at 485. 
84  Id. 
85  Id. 
86  Id. 
87  Id. 
88  Id. 
89  Id. at 485-86. 
90  Id. 
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McMullen argued that Medtronic breached its post sale duty to 
warn, namely because the warning sent out by Medtronic was not 
received before he had gone to the dentist in March of 2001.91  Using 
two FDA regulations—21 C.F.R §§ 821.1 and 814.39—McMullen 
argued that his claim could not be preempted because it would not 
impose requirements on Medtronic that were different or additional to 
those regulations it was already obligated to follow.92   
Turning to the language of the regulations, the court found that 
McMullen’s claims would still be preempted.  First, the court noted 
that 21 C.F.R. § 821.1 did not impose a requirement on the 
manufacturer “to make warning or recall decisions unilaterally, nor 
does it authorize the manufacturer to do so.”93  Second, the court 
noted that 21 C.F.R. § 814.39 “permits a manufacturer to temporarily 
amend a warning pending FDA approval of the proposed changes.”94  
Thus, it does not require a manufacturer to temporarily amend its 
warning.  Therefore, Medtronic did not depart from FDA guidelines. 
The court reaffirmed its decision from Mitchell v. Collagen and 
held:  1) the PMA device approval process imposes specific federal 
requirements on manufacturers; 2) McMullen’s state law tort claim, if 
successful, would have imposed on Medtronic a duty to provide an 
additional warning between January 2001 and March 2001; and 3) 
because the regulations submitted by McMullen do not require a 
manufacturer to issue a temporary warning, McMullen’s claim would 
be imposing an additional requirement on Medtronic that was not 




                                                 
91  Id. at 486. 
92  Id. at 489. 
93  Id. (finding that pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §§ 360h(a) and (e) the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services has the discretion to issue or withhold warnings 
concerning medical devices based on the Secretary’s assessment of the risks); 21 
C.F.R. § 821.1 (2006). 
94  McMullen, 421 F.3d at 489; 21 C.F.R. § 814.39 (2006). 
95  McMullen, 421F.3d at 490. 
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III. WHY THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT IS CORRECT 
 
A common sense approach to what occurs during the PMA 
process should lead one to conclude that the FDA imposes 
requirements on a device during PMA.96  Furthermore, since specific 
requirements already exist for PMA medical devices, allowing state 
tort claims against the manufacturers of these devices will circumvent 
congressional intent.97  Manufacturers would have to spend exorbitant 
amounts of money in litigation and in trying to comply with each 
state’s own interpretation of what is or is not necessary for the device.   
Looking beyond mere common sense analysis of the general two-
part test for preemption, there are several broader policy and 
procedural concerns that favor adopting the 7th Circuit’s rationale.  
One procedural benefit the 7th Circuit’s rationale provides is a bright 
line rule, which are favored by courts for judicial efficiency.  A rule 
requiring case by case determinations would clog judicial dockets with 
costly litigation, not only for the parties involved, but for society at 
large.  The push for bright line rules can be seen in the Supreme 
Court’s Medtronic v. Lohr decision--any manufacturer that markets its 
device through the 510(k) process will not be afforded the protections 
of a preemption defense.98  Nevertheless, because each Justice in 
Medtronic felt that “Congress intended the MDA to pre-empt at least 
some state law,” one can speculate that the Court may have been 
implicitly talking about the PMA process.99  
                                                 
96  See e.g. Brooks v. Howmedica, Inc. 273 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(examining how the FDA required specific warning language to be added to the 
product); McMullen, 421 F.3d at 484-85 (examining at least two requirements the 
FDA required the device to follow before allowing it to be marketed). 
97  See H.R. REP. NO. 94-853, at 45-46 (1976) (“[I]f a substantial number of 
differing requirements applicable to a medical device are imposed by jurisdictions 
other than the Federal government, interstate commerce would be unduly 
burdened”).     
98  Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996). 
99  Id. at 484 (Stevens, J.); Id. at 503 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he MDA will sometimes pre-empt a state law tort 
suit.  I basically agree with Justice O’Connor’s discussion of this point.”); Id. at 509 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I conclude that state 
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While many bright line rules sweep too broadly, the 7th Circuit’s 
PMA preemption rule actually balances the competing policy goals of 
the MDA:  1) guaranteeing medical device innovation in the future 
through uniform device regulation, and 2) protecting the public by not 
allowing medical devices to be marketed until they are safe and 
effective.100  As discussed, the Supreme Court has already forbid 
preemption analysis when devices are marketed using the 510(k) 
process.101  Furthermore, a vast majority of all Class III medical 
devices currently on the market receive approval through this 
process.102  Thus, only in an extremely small percentage of cases 
would a consumer’s claim against a medical device manufacturer be 
foreclosed through preemption.  Since most PMA medical devices are 
truly innovative, that is not substantial equivalents, their device 
manufacturers should be afforded a significant level of protection to 
ensure future innovative growth.   
Assuming that the Supreme Court agreed with the 7th Circuit 
bright line rule, medical device manufacturers would be given an 
incentive to complete the PMA process—the defense of preemption 
should their device become subject to litigation.  Such an incentive 
would not only benefit the manufacturers of the device, but it would 
                                                                                                                   
common-law damages actions do impose ‘requirements’ and are therefore pre-
empted where such requirements would differ from those imposed by the FDCA”). 
100  See generally Brief for The Center for Patient Advocacy and the California 
Health Care Institute as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner/Cross-Respondent, 
Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (Nos. 95-754, 95-886) (examining the 
Senate and House of Representatives Reports to show Congress’ intent to adequately 
balance these goals.  Also mentioning numerous statements made during 
Congressional debates and hearings on the MDA in 1990). 
101  Lohr, 518 U.S. 470. 
102  Id. at 479 (“In 1983, for instance, a House Report concluded that nearly 
1,000 of approximately 1,100 Class III devices that had been introduced to the 
market since 1976 were admitted without any PMA review . . . [T]he House reported 
in 1990 that 80% of new Class III devices were being introduced . . . without PMA 
review”); Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 1363 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that in 2003, 
only 54 of 9,872 medical device applications to the FDA were requesting PMA 
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also benefit the public.  To illustrate, because more manufacturers may 
opt to complete the more rigorous PMA process, more devices would 
then receive heightened review from the FDA before entering the 
market.  The logical end would be that instead of having to litigate for 
injuries sustained using 510(k) devices, consumers may not become 
injured in the first place due to the extensive PMA review. 
Insulating this small percentage of medical device manufacturers 
from tort liability provides a reasonable measure of tort reform in our 
litigious society.  Without the protection of a preemption defense, 
manufacturers of PMA devices will have to make tough decisions 
regarding the future of their respective companies.  For instance, some 
medical device manufacturers may be forced to declare bankruptcy.103  
Others will be forced to pull their devices from the market without 
authoritative proof that the device is harmful.104  Liability concerns 
may cause some companies to forego research or marketing of 
potential breakthroughs in medical technology.105  Each of these 
                                                 
103  Brief Supporting Petitioner/Cross Respondent, supra note 100, at 15-16 
(noting that breast implant litigation forced Dow Corning into Chapter 11 
bankruptcy even though the company made less than one percent of its revenue from 
breast implant sales, and numerous studies had shown that the silicone breast 
implants were not the cause of plaintiffs’ afflictions (citing, e.g. Charles H. 
Hennekens et al., Self-Reported Breast Implants and Connective-Tissue Diseases in 
Female Health Professionals:  A Retrospective Cohort Study, 275 J. AM. MED. 
ASS’N 616, 621 (1996))). 
104  Brief Supporting Petitioner/Cross Respondent, supra note 100, at 20-21 
(noting that Merrell Dow was forced to take its popular drug Bendectin off the 
market because of liability concerns, even though there was no proof that Bendectin 
was harmful to patients (citing, e.g. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 43 F.3d 1311, 
1314 (9th Cir. 1995))); See also Joan E. Shreffler, Comment, Bad Medicine:  Good-
Faith FDA Approval as a Recommended Bar to Punitive Damages in 
Pharmaceutical Products Liability Cases, 84 N.C. L. REV. 737 (2006) (examining 
the current litigation against pharmaceutical giant Merck and its impact upon 
punitive damage awards). 
105  Brief Supporting Petitioner/Cross Respondent, supra note 100, at 18-19 
(noting that liability concerns may cause some manufacturers to cease developing 
important medical advancements (citing, e.g. Peter W. Huber, Safety and the Second 
Best:  The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 
277, 286-88 & n.49 (1985))). 
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scenarios stifles medical device or drug innovation.  While there will 
undoubtedly be costs associated with allowing preemption of PMA 
devices, whether physical, economical, social or emotional, the end 
benefits to society – creating a better healthcare system and saving 
more lives – outweigh these concerns.    
 
IV.  ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE COURT’S REASONING 
 
 The 7th Circuit’s decision in Mitchell v. Collagen, Corp. and 
McMullen v. Medtronic, Inc. constitute the “majority rule” amongst 
U.S. Circuit courts that have decided this issue.106  However, there are 
many courts that have held that the PMA process does not preempt 
state common law tort claims.107  Throughout these decisions there are 
several recurring arguments.  Upon review, each of these arguments 
are faulty and are easily countered. 
Currently, the Eleventh Circuit United States Court of Appeals is 
the highest court that disagrees with 7th Circuit PMA analysis.108  In 
Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc., the 11th Circuit held that the PMA process 
does not preempt common law tort claims.109  Much like the 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr case, Lisa Goodlin brought a claim against 
Medtronic alleging that a pacemaker she had used was negligently 
                                                 
106  See Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2004); Brooks v. 
Howmedica, Inc., 273 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2001) (en banc, 7-2 decision); Kemp v. 
Medtronic, Inc., 231 F.3d 216 (6th Cir. 2000); Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 126 F.3d 
902 (7th Cir. 1997); Martin v. Medtronic, Inc., 254 F.3d 573 (5th Cir. 2001); King v. 
Collagen Corp, 983 F.2d 1130 (1st Cir. 1993). 
107 See Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc. 167 F.3d 1367 (11th Cir. 1999); Woods v. 
Gliatech, Inc. 218 F. Supp. 2d 802, 808 (W.D. Va. 2002); Fiore v. Collagen Corp., 
930 P.2d 477, 482 (Ariz. 1996); Lakie v. Smith-Kline Beecham 965 F. Supp. 49, 54 
(D.D.C. 1997); Walker v. Johnson & Johnson Vision Prods., 552 N.W. 2d 679, 684-
685 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996); Connelly v. Iolab Corp., 927 S.W. 2d 848, 854 (Mo. 
1996); Green v. Dolsky, 685 A.2d 110, 116 (Pa. 1996); Wutzke v. Schwaegler, 940 
P.2d 1386, 1391-92 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997); Weiland v. Teletronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 
721 N.E.2d 1149 (Ill. 1999); Haidak v. Collagen Corp., 67 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D. Mass. 
1999). 
108  Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 F.3d 1367 (11th Cir. 1999). 
109  Id. 
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designed.110  The only difference in Goodlin’s case was that the 
alleged defect in the pacemaker stemmed from a type of lead wire that 
had been approved under PMA, rather than through the 510(k) 
process.111  During the “extensive” PMA review, Medtronic conducted 
numerous trials of the lead wire in the pacemaker and submitted the 
results to the FDA.112  In turn, the FDA asked for further information 
about the lead wire and requested further testing before issuing a final 
PMA.113  More than three years after submitting the lead wire to the 
FDA, Medtronic received final PMA.114   
The main contention made by the Goodlin Court was that “[T]o 
prevail . . . Medtronic must identify a specific federal requirement 
imposed on its particular device that would preempt any conflicting or 
additional state requirement inherent in a jury verdict in Goodlin’s 
favor.”115  The court examined the behavior of the FDA during the 
PMA process, and noted that to be considered a requirement, the FDA 
“[M]ust [impose] some ascertainable condition.”116  Because the FDA 
only asked for information and testing to be completed, and 
“[I]ssue[d] no regulation, order or any other statement of its 
substantive benchmark,” the court argued no requirement was 
imposed.117
The 11th Circuit appears to argue then, that had the FDA required 
certain language be added to warnings or other labeling, or had the 
FDA made a design change to the pacemaker, the claim would then be 
preempted because a substantive requirement was issued.  However, 
                                                 
110  Id. at 1369. 
111  Id. at 1368. 
112  Id. at 1369. 
113  Id. at 1370. 
114  Id.  
115  Id. at 1372. 
116  Id. at 1374. 
117  Id. at 1375; See also Michael P. DiNatale, Patients Beware:  Preemption of 
Common Law Claims Under the Medical Device Amendments, 39 J. MARSHALL L. 
REV. 75 (arguing that the 11th Circuit’s decision was correct, yet failing to examine 
the numerous cases where the FDA has required specific warnings, labeling or 
design changes to devices during the PMA process). 
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this line of reasoning is disingenuous for two reasons.  First, the FDA 
does issue substantive changes to many products that undergo PMA 
review.118  Second, if the FDA is required to issue substantive 
requirements on a device’s warnings, labeling or design to constitute a 
requirement, a manufacturer is given an incentive to draft poor 
warnings or labels, or poorly design a minor aspect of the device.  In 
turn, the FDA will then require certain changes to substantive elements 
of the device’s warnings, labeling or design, triggering preemption of 
common law tort claims.   
Certainly, Congress did not intend to reward manufacturers with 
the affirmative defense of preemption if, for example, the 
manufacturer submitted poorly drafted warnings to the FDA, knowing 
that they would be changed.  A better rationale to this 11th Circuit 
misstep is that the FDA’s silence with regard to substantive elements 
of a device’s warnings, labels or design, means that the FDA has found 
the existing substantive elements of the device to be beyond reproach.  
In other words, the FDA’s silence alone creates requirements on a 
device, as the manufacturer must comply with the approved warnings, 
labels or design submitted to the FDA.   
 Other lower courts have attempted different arguments in 
attacking the 7th Circuit rationale.  One line of argument focuses on 
Part IV of Justice Stevens plurality opinion in Medtronic for guidance, 
misinterpreting this portion of the opinion for the holding of the court.  
For example, in Lakie v. Smith-Kline Beecham, the District of 
Columbia District Court gave great weight to the plurality opinion in 
Part IV of Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, and held that the PMA does not 
preempt common law claims because the Supreme Court had “held 
that Congress did not intend to bar state common law causes of action 
for injuries resulting from defective medical devices.”   119  The court, 
citing Part IV of Justice Stevens opinion in Medtronic v. Lohr, noted 
that Congress was primarily concerned with preempting conflicting 
state statutes or regulations.120   
                                                 
118  See e.g. cases cited supra note 96. 
119  965 F. Supp. 49, 54 (D.D.C. 1997). 
120  Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 489 (1996) (plurality) (Stevens, J.).   
294 
23
Eckburg: Medical Device Preemption: A Reasonable Avenue of Tort Reform?
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2006
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                    Volume 1, Issue 1                    Spring 2006 
 Such an interpretation fails to consider that a majority of the Court 
in Medtronic v. Lohr held that state common law causes of action do 
impose requirements when the manufacturer has complied with all 
requirements and regulations during the PMA process and yet liability 
is still alleged.121  Moreover, this interpretation fails to examine the 
language of the FDA’s own preemption provision.  This provision 
mentions that States cannot continue with respect to “specific 
counterpart regulations” or “specific requirements” applicable to a 
device.122  To argue that the FDA did not intend to preempt state 
common law tort actions would render the phrase “specific counterpart 
regulations” in the preemption provision mere surplusage. 
A second type of argument made by some lower courts, relying on 
Part V of Justice Stevens opinion, is that common law tort claims 
impose laws of general applicability.  In other words, such laws apply 
to all products, not just to a specific medical device in question, and 
thus do not impose additional or different requirements.  For example, 
in Mears v. Marshall, an Oregon Appellate Court argued that while the 
PMA process imposed specific federal requirements, common law 
causes of action only pose a general duty and would thus not constitute 
a specific state requirement. 123  The Mears Court looked to the 
language of the Court in Part V of Medtronic: 
 
Similarly, the general state common-law 
requirements in this case were not 
specifically developed 'with respect to' 
medical devices. Accordingly, they are 
not the kinds of requirements that 
Congress and the FDA feared would 
impede the ability of federal regulators 
to implement and enforce specific 
federal requirements . . . These general 
obligations are no more a threat to 
                                                 
121 See supra notes 44 & 52. 
122 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (2006). 
123 Mears v. Marshall, 944 P.2d 984, 994 (Or. Ct. App. 1997). 
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federal requirements that would be a 
state-law duty to comply with local fire 
prevention regulations and zoning codes, 
or to use due care in the training and 
supervision of a workforce. These state 
requirements therefore escape pre-
emption, not because the source of the 
duty is a judge-made common-law rule, 
but rather because their generality leaves 
them outside the category of 
requirements that § 360k envisioned to 
be 'with respect to' specific devices such 
as pacemakers.124
 
 While the Mears Court was technically correct in noting that Part 
V of Medtronic was a majority opinion, the court failed to understand 
that Justice Breyer had written separately to distinguish himself from 
the majority on this point.  Breyer argued that the MDA preempts a 
“requirement that takes the form of a standard of care or behavior 
imposed by a state law tort action.”125  The downfall of Medtronic’s 
argument, according to Justice Breyer, was that the 510(k) process did 
not impose specific federal requirements.126
 
V.  SUPREME COURT ANALYSIS 10 YEARS AFTER MEDTRONIC V. LOHR – 
THE LIKELIHOOD OF PREEMPTION IN PMA CASES 
 
Within the past few months, our nation has witnessed the rise of 
two new Justices to the Supreme Court, Chief Justice John Roberts 
and Justice Samuel Alito.  Within the focus of preemption under the 
MDA, the vote of these two justices will prove to be vital.  Both 
                                                 
124 Id. at 990 (quoting from Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 500 (1996)); See 
also Oja v. Howmedica, Inc., 111 F.3d 782, 789 (10th Cir. 1997) (making a similar 
argument in the investigational device exemption arena). 
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former Chief Justice William Rehnquist and retired Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor were votes in Medtronic that favored somewhat broad 
preemption.127  In Justice O’Connor’s opinion from Medtronic, she 
noted that the 510(k) process merely evaluated whether the device 
could be deemed “substantially equivalent” to a device already on the 
market, and thus placed no requirements on the device.128  However, 
Justice O’Connor argued that the generally applicable manufacturing 
and labeling regulations imposed by the FDA are stringent enough to 
create specific requirements on a device, thus preempting any tort 
claims.129  In turn, one can fairly assume that Justices subscribing to 
such an opinion would find preemption under the even more rigorous 
PMA process. 
 
A.  A New Court Rises? – The Impact of Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justice Alito 
 
Both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito have been exposed to 
the debate over whether the PMA process preempts state common law 
claims.   
 
1.  English v. Mentor Corp. – Alito’s Alignment 
 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Medtronic, Justice Alito 
took part in English v. Mentor Corp., a decision regarding the 
preemptive effect of the 510(k) process under the MDA.130  In 
English, the plaintiff had brought a claim for damages against the 
                                                 
127  Lohr, 518 U.S. at 513-514 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (noting that in Justice O’Connor’s opinion she felt that some, if not all, of the 
Lohrs’ common law claims regarding labeling and manufacturing were preempted 
because of the requirements imposed by the FDA through such regulations as the 
Good Manufacturing Practices and federal labeling requirements). 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 English v. Mentor Corp., 67 F.3d 477 (3d Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (oral 
arguments heard by Judge Alito, Judge Nygaard and Judge Cowen). 
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manufacturer of an inflatable penile prosthesis.131  The device had 
been cleared for marketing under the 510(k) exemption to the PMA 
requirement.132  The Court held that the 510(k) process did place 
specific requirements on the inflatable penile prosthesis and therefore 
English’s claims were preempted.133  While this decision would later 
be indirectly overturned by the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Medtronic, one can infer that if Alito did not dissent from the per 
curiam opinion, he likely decide that the more rigorous PMA process 
also preempts common law claims.   
 
2.  Friend of the Court - Chief Justice John Roberts 
 
Chief Justice John Roberts authored an amicus brief filed with the 
Supreme Court in the Medtronic case, and argued that the 510(k) 
process imposes specific federal requirements on a device and should 
therefore preempt all of Lora Lohr’s claims.134  The brief is dedicated 
to the argument that Congress purposely wanted to preempt common 
law tort claims against medical device manufacturers.135  Doing so, 
Chief Justice Roberts argues, will allow manufacturers to continue 
developing potentially life-saving devices that will further patient care 
and allow those in our society to lead fuller lives.136  Chief Justice 
Roberts stated: 
 
The divergent patchwork of state 
products liability laws in this country 
imposes a ‘liability tax’ that is passed on 
to all of us in the form of increased 
product costs and insurance premiums.  
In the case of medical products, 
                                                 
131  Id. at 478. 
132  Id. at 480. 
133  Id. at 483-84. 
134  Brief Supporting Petitioner/Cross Respondent, supra note 100. 
135  Id. 
136  Id. at 4. 
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however, products liability laws exact an 
additional, far greater societal toll:  they 
stunt the development of new and 
improved medical products and drive 
existing products from the marketplace.  
Thus, many potentially life-saving 
medical products are not developed by 
manufacturers today because of liability 
concerns, and existing, FDA-cleared 
products are pulled from the market by 
manufacturers facing massive liability in 
suits brought by users, even though in 
many cases there is no scientifically 
credible evidence that these products are 
harmful.  The quality of patient care in 
this country suffers as a result.137
 
 As this was Chief Justice Roberts’ only exposure to the 
preemption realm of the MDA, it may prove decisive once he has a 
vote to cast in an actual Supreme Court decision.  If Chief Justice 
Roberts thought the 510(k) process should preempt common law tort 
claims, the logical conclusion is that he would also vote for 
preemption in PMA medical device cases. 
 
B. Justice Scalia & Justice Thomas – The Rocks of Preemption 
 
In Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, the Supreme Court examined 
whether the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act 
(FIFRA) preempts state-law claims for damages.138  FIFRA contains 
an express preemption provision similar to the one found in the 
                                                 
137  Id. 
138  125 S. Ct. 1788 (2005). 
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MDA.139  The Court ultimately remanded the case to the lower court 
to determine whether particular common law duties were equivalent to 
FIFRA’s misbranding standards.140  If equivalent, the claims would 
survive preemption analysis.   
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, wrote separately to 
stress that the majority had left out a step in its reasoning with regard 
to a few of the claims:  “ 
 
A state law cause of action, even if not 
specific to labeling, nevertheless 
imposes a labeling requirement “in 
addition to or different from” FIFRA’s 
when it attaches liability to statements 
on the label that do not produce liability 
under FIFRA.  The state-law cause of 
action then adds some supplemental 
requirement of truthfulness to FIFRA’s 
requirement that labeling statements not 
be “false or misleading.”141   
 
The same reasoning applies to state law causes of action against 
medical devices that have received approval under the PMA process.  
During PMA, the FDA extensively reviews the device’s design, 
labeling, warnings, safety and effectiveness.  As mentioned, the FDA 
often tells manufacturers what to specifically include in its 
warnings.142  Should no specific instruction need to be given, the FDA 
has determined that there is a reasonable assurance of safety and 
effectiveness.  Thus, due to these stringent requirements, imposing 
liability on a manufacturer of a PMA device when liability would not 
                                                 
139  See 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2006) (“Such State shall not impose or continue in 
effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or those required 
under this subchapter”).
140  Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1803. 
141  Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1805 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part 
and dissenting in part).  
142  See e.g. cases cited supra note 96. 
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attach under the FDCA creates a requirement different from or in 
addition to those already required by the FDA, and preemption 
therefore applies. 
 
C. Justice Breyer – The Swing Vote 
 
As mentioned, Justice Breyer’s opinion in Medtronic focused on 
two main reasons why preemption was not valid.  First, as Breyer was 
unable to determine what Congress intended as the scope of 
preemption under the MDA, he argued that “courts may infer that the 
relevant administrative agency possesses a degree of leeway to 
determine which rules, regulations or other administrative actions will 
have preemptive effect.”143  This statement even comports with Justice 
Stevens’ opinion that “the [FDA] is uniquely qualified to determine 
whether a particular form of the state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.”144  Breyer went on to argue that one can determine 
whether the FDA intends for rules or regulations to have preemptive 
effect by looking to “statements in ‘regulations, preambles, 
interpretive statements, and responses to comments,’ as well as 
through the exercise of [the FDA’s] explicitly designated power to 
exempt state requirements from preemption.”145
After years of silence regarding the preemptive scope of its 
preemption regulation, as it pertains to the 510(k) process and the 
PMA process, the FDA recently issued an interpretive statement of 
what it feels is preempted.  In Horn v. Thoratec Corp., the Third 
Circuit received an amicus curiae brief from the FDA prior to issuing a 
decision regarding preemption analysis for PMA medical devices.  In 
the brief, the FDA notes the substantial difference between the PMA 
process and the 510(k) process: 
 
                                                 
143 Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 505 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment). 
144 Id. at 496 (plurality) (Stevens, J.). 
145 Id. at 506 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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A manufacturer can obtain an FDA 
finding of ‘substantial equivalence’ by 
submitting a pre-market notification to 
the agency in accordance with section 
510(k) of the [Act].  A device found to 
be ‘substantially equivalent’ to a 
predicate device is said to be ‘cleared’ 
by FDA (as opposed to ‘approved’ by 
the agency under a PMA).  A pre-market 
notification . . . is thus entirely different 
from a PMA, which must include date 
sufficient to demonstrate to FDA that the 
device is safe and effective.  The number 
of medical devices that receive PMA 
review each year is dwarfed by the 
number of those that are marketed 
pursuant to cleared Section 510(k).  In 
fiscal year 2003, for example, original 
PMA’s represented only 54 of 9,872 
major submissions received.  The 
previous fiscal year, original PMA’s 
accounted for 49 of 10,323 total 
submissions.146
 
It appears then, that the FDA considers these two processes to be 
completely different:  the 510(k) process is really similar to a licensing 
process, while the PMA process actually results in FDA approval of 
the device for safety and effectiveness concerns.  Justice Breyer, and 
even other members of the Court that joined Justice Stevens’ opinion, 
may find this FDA interpretation to be convincing, if not dispositive of 
the issue.   
The second reason Justice Breyer did not find preemption in 
Medtronic was because even if one could argue that FDA imposes 
requirements on 510(k) devices, none of those requirements are 
                                                 
146 Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163, 167 (3d Cir. 2004). 
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actually specific to the device.147  Given the aforementioned 
difference between the 510(k) process and the PMA process, and the 
fact that during the PMA process the FDA often does draft or require 
specific warnings or device designs, Justice Breyer will be hard 
pressed to argue that the FDA does not make specific requirements of 
devices during the PMA process. 
Thus, it appears that at least five Justices are likely to adopt a 
similar rule to that put forward by the 7th Circuit.  While by no means 
is this analysis conclusive evidence of how the Supreme Court may 
eventually decide the issue, it does provide educated speculation as to 
whether a clear majority exists.  Time will only tell whether such 




 “[M]edical devices—like all man-made devices—malfunction.  
No federal regulatory or state tort law regime can prevent that.”148  
However, to ensure that medical device innovation continues 
throughout the 21st century, reasonable protections must be afforded to 
medical device manufacturers.  The 7th Circuit’s rule regarding 
preemption for PMA medical devices is one reasonable avenue of 
protecting a small percentage of medical device manufacturers, while 
balancing the competing goals of medical device innovation and 
protection of the public.   
 
                                                 
147  Lohr, 518 U.S. at 507 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
148  Brief Supporting Petitioner/Cross Respondent, supra note 100, at 27. 
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